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1. The useful insights of social neuroscience
for anti-discrimination law
The scientific discoveries of neuroscience, and more specifically the
emerging field called social neuroscience (Cacioppo and Decety, 2011;
Todorov et al., 2012), have provided important new insights to the field
of anti-discrimination law and theory. By social neuroscience, I mean a
broadly interdisciplinary perspective that uses natural science-based methods
to inquire into how the “social brain” works (Matusall, Kaufmann, &
Christen, 2011, p. 9). As an interdisciplinary field, social neuroscience
borrows frommany natural science traditions, including medicine, epidemi-
ology, behavioral economics, animal behavior studies, experimental social
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and developmental psychology, game theory and computer science, to
learn more about how the brain responds to its social environment
(Cacioppo & Decety, 2011, pp. 5–7).
The psychological disciplines have long played a role in law (Dailey,
2017). In an earlier era, the psychology that influenced legal theorists
was often Freudian, as Dailey explores. In the 20th Century, Freud provided
important contributions to legal theorists, including the so-called “American
Legal Realists”—who are, somewhat confusingly, anti-realists in the philo-
sophical sense, in that they viewed law as thoroughly socially constructed
and primarily generated through politics rather than logical rules (Leiter,
2002). Theorists such as Jerome Frank drew from Freud to argue that the
forces motivating judges and other legal actors were often lodged in the
unconscious, and thus far more complex and opaque than law traditionally
assumed (Frank, 2009).
Freudian psychology, based primarily in humanistic, hermeneutical
traditions rather than natural science methods, differs greatly from neuro-
science and related disciplines that focus on experimentally disprovable
propositions. According to one observer’s characterization, the unconscious
that neuroscientists describe is “relatively passive, like computer software”
(Dailey, 2017, p. 231), as patterns of neurons fire to cause automatic asso-
ciations. In contrast, Freud’s unconscious is wild, colorful, and free, engaged
in a dynamic process of creation as the mind makes imaginative associations
akin to artistic work. It may seem somewhat disheartening to move from
literature and imagination to science and its tightly controlled disprovable
hypotheses, as I will discuss later in the article. Nonetheless, in contempo-
rary times, natural science-based approaches have become predominant in
many of the psychological, philosophical, and social studies disciplines that
influence law.
In one key respect, however, neuroscience and Freudian psychology
share a fundamental insight highly relevant to law. That insight concerns
the fact that much of human action originates in the unconscious. Freud
posited this idea in his concept of the “id.” Neuroscientists have proved the
existence of the unconscious, though the neuroscientists’ unconscious has, as
already noted, a very different character than Freud’s. Neuroscience and related
disciplines by this point have established beyond doubt that a great deal of
what humans (and other creatures) are able to perceive, process in their brains,
and then respond to comes into the brain and then motivates conduct without
consciousness at any level. The way the eye perceives its environment is one
good example, as popular neuroscience writer Leonard Mlodinow explains.
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Unconscious processes organize the unmanageably complex data we receive
through our senses, and especially through our eyes, in order to even
begin to make our surroundings intelligible (Mlodinow, 2013, p. 35).
The brain does this so quickly and automatically that we are not aware of
all the processing that takes place before we can start to make sense of
our environment in both its physical and social aspects.
Social neuroscientists have established that similar mechanisms account
for much of human social behavior. The human brain perceives and res-
ponds to its social environment through mechanisms that often work prior
to human consciousness or volition. Humans’ judgments about what is
safe and what is dangerous, and what is pleasant, worthwhile, and valuable
and what—or who—is not, all occur with split-second timing, relying on
so-called “fast” thinking processes (Kahneman, 2013). Without such “fast
thinking,” we could not operate in the world; it would take far too long
to deliberate about every perception and reaction.
At the same time, fast, non-deliberative thinking carries with it many
irrationalities that introduce non-volitional biases of many kinds into human
thinking and conduct (Kahneman, 2013). Humans exhibit these biases in
the form of many irrational predilections. These include a preference for
material goods they already have versus goods of the same value they could
acquire, an “optimism” bias that anticipates that situations will work out
better than they are actually likely to, and a bias toward thinking more highly
of one’s personal abilities than an objective assessment would indicate.
Another is the brain’s common practice of inventing false memories to fill
in gaps in information that one has forgotten (Kahneman, 2013). Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, as well as many other behavioral economists
and experimental psychologists, have established the existence not only of
these, but many other types of bias in what they call “fast,” or quick, intu-
itive thinking. Further research will undoubtedly lead to many more discov-
eries, but the basic proposition—that much of what the human brain does in
the social realm is completely unconscious and often irrational—is beyond
contestation among brain scientists today.
Such scientifically tested evidence, based on verifiable facts, may make
especially useful contributions to law, given that law is also a discipline
concerned with finding factual truth (albeit in quite a different way from
science) (Haack, 2014). Neuroscience’s emphasis on provable facts—or,
better put, on disprovable hypotheses—would seem well suited to law’s
evidentiary focus on proving facts at specified standards of proof (such as
more likely than not (50%+) or beyond a reasonable doubt (75%–95%)
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(Haack, 2014, p. 32–33)). Thus, I will argue below, neuroscientific evidence
can prove quite useful in anti-discrimination cases. An even more high value
use may be in guiding the reform of law-related policy, rules, structures and
systems more generally. For social neuroscience to contribute to such
system-wide reform, however, more than the mere weight of scientific
authority will be required; social movement actors will have to embrace this
project and infuse it with values and rhetoric in order to persuade in the
political sphere. Thus, no matter how good the science becomes, its use
in law as a general rather than case-specific matter will require advocates
to move beyond the scientific realm and back into the humanistic territory
of values, tropes, politics, and culture.
One of the ways in which social neuroscience can contribute to
anti-discrimination law is in the field of implicit bias research. Along with
biases in the way that human brains think about statistical prediction, mate-
rial objects, the self, the past, and a host of other matters, researchers have
proven the existence of inherent and inescapable biases in the way humans
perceive and react to human difference (Cunningham, Haas, & Jahn, 2011;
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Put most bluntly, researchers
have repeatedly found that humans can have uncontrollable aversions to
those they perceive as different from their own groups and/or “in” groups
with high social status (Haidt, 2013). Even fellow members of socially
defined “out” groups, or groups that are socially constructed to have low
status, tend to have these biases; members of low-status groups may inter-
nalize the negative views that groups with privilege and power have
constructed of them (Morrison, Decety, & Molenberghs, 2012).
These biases have been shown to be extremely hard to extinguish, even
with great effort at control. Some measures of bias, such as the often-used
Stroop test, measure just this effort at control, which researchers theorize
causes a slowdown in subjects’ abilities to engage in competing mental tasks
(Cunningham et al., 2011, p. 220). Even with anti-bias training, persons
continue to exhibit implicit biases, though they may be somewhat less likely
to act on them, as discussed further below.
Biases can be trivial—for example, researchers have proved that human
subjects prefer others who are defined as being on the same “team” based on
what shirt they are assigned to wear (Molenberghs, 2013, p. 1532). Biases
can be problematic but functional in some ways; for example, having strong
in-group identification helps work teams work together especially well
(Haidt, 2013, p. 275), but at the same time can create problems for managers
in integrating those teams into a larger organization (Mlodinow, 2013,
p. 172). Biases that are individually held can be pernicious but not combine
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to produce structural subordination. At the other extreme, biases can be out-
right deadly, as documented in the many horrific genocides that have
occurred in modern history all around the world (Sapolsky, 2017,
pp. 570–79). Illegal discrimination results partly from biases that are perni-
cious and structurally embedded in social institutions, practices, and the
distribution of key resources.
Social neuroscience literature shows a strong connection between
implicit bias and the dynamics that cause people to conform to the norms
of the groups in which they belong. At the same time that most people
generally seek to conform to group norms, they also judge harshly both
in-group nonconformists and outsiders. One well known experiment,
dubbed the ultimatum game, illustrates these dual phenomena. This exper-
iment involves giving one player, called the proposer, a sum of money, and
then asking the proposer to offer to divide that sum between herself and
another player, called the responder (Mendoza, Lane, & Amodio, 2014).
The responder then chooses whether to accept or reject the proposal. If
the responder accepts, the players split the money according to the pro-
poser’s offer. If the responder rejects the proposal, neither player receives
any money. Experiments repeatedly find that proposers reward more money
to responders who are arbitrarily designated as fellow in-group members
than to responders who are identified as out-group members—even
when an option is to award the money so that both groups end upwith more
(Mendoza et al., 2014, p. 663). In other words, humans’ focus on in-group
likeness is so strong that it outweighs the classic economic assumption that
individuals act to maximize self-interest. And people punish outsiders even
when there is no rational reason to do so.
Experiments involving political affiliations have similarly shown
the effects of group identity on human judgment. These experiments have
shown that people even perceive facts about the actions of political in-group
members differently than facts about out-group members. In one experi-
ment, researchers showed a video recording of a controversial, roughly
played football game between Princeton and Dartmouth Universities to
students from the two schools (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954). Students from
Princeton counted Dartmouth players as having committed more fouls,
whereas students from Dartmouth viewed the number of fouls committed
by the two teams as equal. In effect, the researchers explained, the two groups
of students had viewed “a totally different game” (pp. 129–30). Another exper-
iment tested how subjects viewed video clips of anti-abortion protests at
clinics (Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans, & Rachlinski, 2012). This exper-
iment found that subjects holding anti-abortion views saw protestors
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commit fewer illegal acts than did subjects who favored access to abortion
(Kahan et al., 2012, p. 884). These effects occur even when groups are newly
created. Experimenters randomly divided participants into a “red” group
and a “blue” group and then asked them to watch video clips to determine
which team’s members pushed a button faster (Molenberghs, 2013, p. 1523).
The experimenters had constructed the video clips so that the two groups
were exactly equivalent on this measure. Each team, however, judged
members of their own team as faster. These results are consistent with still
another experiment that found that people are more willing to donate
money to fellow in-group members as opposed to members of outsider
groups who are in distress (Molenberghs, 2013, p. 1533).
Researchers in the fields of experimental psychology and neu-
roeconomics have also found, somewhat surprisingly, that human subjects
make decisions more rapidly when they are making altruistic decisions
rather than selfish ones. This suggests that altruism toward others in one’s
group, rather than selfishness, is the more powerful automatic or intuitive
response. As neuropsychologist Jonathan Haidt puts it, the evidence shows
that we are “groupish,” rather than selfish, in our moral reasoning. Haidt
argues that humans’ “hivish” moral nature makes it easier for us to work
in groups and organizations (Haidt, 2013, pp. 258–84). By activating
“pride, loyalty, and enthusiasm” among employees, for example, managers
reduce the need for costly employee monitoring. Group-serving moral
impulses and bonds of trust help cooperative endeavors succeed (Haidt,
2013, p. 275).
Researchers further theorize that disfavoring outsiders contributes to
how human beings form positive self-identity and self-esteem (Molenberghs,
2013, p. 1532; Morrison et al., 2012, p. 2115; Abrams & Hogg, 1990,
p. 196). Social identity theory proposes that positive self-development invol-
ves individuals’ positive identification with the groups to which they belong
(Abrams & Hogg, 1990). In other words, persons identify with models of
in-group behavior they view as admirable and, without conscious volition
or even awareness, define outsiders as inferior.
Where groups are not interconnected in ways that reflect disparate
power, privilege and access to resources, these dynamics may in essence
cancel each other out as different groups view themselves as better than
others. At least, in egalitarian conditions, in-group preferences do not
become ossified in structures and institutions. But where insider groups pos-
sess disparate power, the mechanisms of implicit in-group preference and
out-group bias produce unlawful discrimination. Writ large, implicit bias
becomes discrimination.
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Illegal discrimination against protected classes falls in this category of
socially shared, and thus compounded, implicit biases. In modern, highly
complex and diverse societies, implicit biases cause great harm. In a modern
world, illegal discrimination generally involves irrational and counterpro-
ductive negative treatment of out-group members. Such discrimination
introduces inefficiencies into economic relations and causes enormous psy-
chological, economic, physical, and medical harm to those subject to it
(Pager & Shepherd, 2008; Stone, 2012). Discrimination may lead to inter-
personal and society-wide violence, loss of human creative and productive
potential, physical and psychological harms perpetuated across generations
through epigenetics and other mechanisms, as well as animosity, resentment,
backlash, political and social conflict and much more. Demagogues exploit
implicit biases and nations fall into disrepute because of them. Thus universal
human rights declarations condemn discrimination against protected classes
and all modern societies prohibit it (see Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 2020, Art. 2). The question thus arises: how might neuroscience
help law eradicate, or at least curtail, unlawful discrimination?
2. Using social neuroscience in the law to counter
implicit bias
There are many potential uses of neuroscience research in anti-
discrimination law. I here sketch just a few directions that I see as useful from
the perspective of my own disciplinary background in anti-discrimination
law, history and theory. In this short treatment, I will discuss four broad
categories of uses that present special promise. These include: (1) abolishing
or minimizing reliance on intent standards for proving unlawful discrimina-
tion; (2) fashioning more effective remedies for unlawful discrimination;
(3) expanding doctrines about what counts as unlawful discrimination, based
on new understandings of the harms discriminatory treatment causes; and
(4) supporting a social movement to expand human rights law to recognize
a general right to “act differently,” within the bounds of not harming others.
2.1 Minimizing the use of intent standards to prove unlawful
discrimination
Many countries have moved beyond, or at least fine-tuned, their intent
standards for proving discrimination. Canada, for example, weighs the harm
caused by an allegedly discriminatory practice against the strength of the
rationale for using it (Seiner, 2006, p. 119). Other countries, including
the United States, still usually require a showing of intent to make out
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disparate treatment-based discrimination in key areas of social resource allo-
cation such as housing and employment. Many legal systems, including the
United States, have non-intent based options for proving discrimination,
such as “disparate impact” or “effects” standards that call for a showing that
a challenged practice has unjustifiably harsh effects on persons in protected
categories (Carle, 2017). These effects tests, however, typically require com-
plainants to surmount high hurdles of proof in various respects. Thus,
intent-based standards remain the predominant way of proving unlawful dis-
crimination in many less progressive national systems of anti-discrimination
law, including the United States.
The findings of social neuroscience push toward the elimination or mod-
ification of intent standards for proving discrimination. Social neuroscience
shows that decisions based on implicit bias typically occur without conscious
volition. It makes little logical sense to require a showing of malevolent
intent to discriminate when science shows that decision makers most often
do not act with malice. Instead, their acts take place at an unconscious level
without any awareness of discriminatory intent, much less any volition or
desire to act discriminatorily.
As already noted, some legal systems have blended intent and impact
standards into hybrid approaches that assess the burden of a challenged prac-
tice in relation its benefits (Seiner, 2006). Under a science-based view, these
approaches make far more sense because implicit bias research casts doubt on
the validity of accusing most actors who have been alleged to have engaged
in discrimination of having “intended” to discriminate.
In addition, intent requirements make it hard to prove discrimination
because it is usually very difficult to prove what has gone on inside a res-
pondent’s head (if an individual) or a collective decision making process
(if a collective decision). Absent cases with so-called “smoking gun”
evidence, where a respondent decision maker has openly admitted to
prejudiced motives, it is very hard to establish what the decision maker’s
thought process was. Since the burden of proof in such cases remains with
the complainant, the complainant typically ends up losing because the facts
simply do not establish what the respondent’s true motives were.
Under the lessons that can be drawn from implicit bias research,
questions about the respondent’s conscious intent should be eliminated.
Instead, statutory anti-discrimination schemes should require complainants
to point to harm to a person or persons in a protected class that could
be avoided by modifying a nonessential business practice or structure or
by introducing practices that work to oppose unconscious bias, such as
8 Susan D. Carle
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training, priming at key decision points, and the like. These approaches
would do far more to eradicate discrimination that current legal rules ignore,
while at the same time eliminating the blame and finger-pointing that often
is not justified given the non-volitional nature of much bias. Such reform
would produce better social results along with less social friction and back-
lash against the important project of extinguishing discrimination’s harm.
Eliminating or downplaying the intent standard in anti-discrimination
law would also make it easier to settle or resolve cases. As noted, no one
wants to admit to intentional discrimination because that is an admission
of a moral wrong. Moreover, since, as neuroscience shows, many actors
whose implicit bias may have led them to take discriminatory actions will
be totally unaware of having committed wrongful acts, they will, quite
understandably, resist demands that they admit to doing so. Accusing some-
one of malevolent “intent” by accusing them of intentional discrimination
does not advance the ball in typical cases. Acting in good faith is, after all,
how respondents typically experience their actions, so they are likely to
insist on being vindicated rather agreeing to engage in problem-solving
approaches. Even if in fact non-volitional implicit bias may also have been
at play—and probably often is given that all persons harbor implicit biases—
non-accusatory problem-solving modes of approaching discrimination
problems often may be far more effective in the longer run.
In short, a standard based on the effects of decisions on members
of protected categories burdened with group histories of structural and
other forms of discrimination could make it easier to recruit those with
power—the ones who are making discriminatory decisions—to join the
teamworking toward solutions rather than remaining defensive and resistant
members of the opposition. Institutional leaders may find it far more palat-
able to be recruited to help dismantle practices or systems that produce
discrimination rather than to be called upon to defend actions they experi-
ence as having been made in good faith. It is, after all, structures and history
that produce implicit bias. An important step in eradicating implicit bias
requires examining and reforming the institutions, ideas, and structures that
encode certain types of prejudice against others into human thinking.
Of course, sometimes social justice activists very much want to prove the
moral wrong of intentional, conscious and blatant animus against person in
protected categories. I have documented these impulses in the face of
blatant, open racism in studying the history of the development of U.S. fed-
eral anti-discrimination law. In early stages of that particular history, more
radical racial justice advocates wanted to pursue intent-based discrimination
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standards, while more moderate, sociologically inclined reformers wanted
to engage in voluntarist, effects-focused, problem-solving approaches
(Carle, 2011). These camps only later switched sides, so that today in the
United States it is usually the most left-leaning anti-discrimination advocates
who push for effects-based or disparate impact theories while more moder-
ate and conservative jurists defend intent-based standards as all that should
exist under US law (see, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 2009). But to be sure,
situations in which conscious and purposeful bad intent does exist certainly
are not gone from the face of the discrimination landscape, and these are
important to address through law as well. They can best be addressed, how-
ever, by including a special category of particularly bad discrimination based
on a showing of open and conscious hostility and animus. This category of
truly bad actors, who have admitted or displayed particularly malevolent and
egregious prejudice, could be subject to higher damages or other penalties,
such as extra fines and/or punitive damages. The problem with present
standards is that the on/off switch of liability and duty to rectify harm gets
triggered only if “intent” is shown, leaving many decisions and actions
based on implicit bias without remedy and thus essentially unaddressed by
law. In conclusion, consistent with neuro-scientific findings that bias is often
unconscious and non-volitional, anti-discrimination law could:
• Lower the moral opprobrium attached to garden-variety discriminatory
actions;
• Continue to provide and even enhance legal remedies for discrimination;
• Focus anti-discrimination law on dismantling discriminatory institutions
and systems, including institutions of unconscious prejudice encoded in
actors’ brains;
• Save punitive sanctions for egregious cases of blatant prejudice.
These approaches should lead to more successful individual cases, more pro-
gress in dismantling discrimination, andmore social benefit for all the reasons
discrimination constitutes a social harm, as already discussed above.
2.2 Fashioning remedies for discrimination
Social neuroscientists have not only studied how implicit bias occurs but
also what can prevent actors with power over others from acting on
their implicit biases. Unfortunately, that research shows that it is extremely
difficult to exterminate implicit bias (Lai et al., 2014, pp. 1780–82).
In comparing 17 studies of interventions to lessen implicit bias, Lia and
his colleagues found that the majority of those interventions were
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completely ineffective, and the ones that were somewhat effective were only
weakly so. However, other studies have shown that sometimes professionals
can be trained not to act on their implicit biases even though those biases
remain. For example, research shows that police officers can be trained to
avoid pulling the trigger due to implicit racial bias even though the
same training of lay people cannot produce this result (Correll et al., 2007).
Another important finding is that implicit bias can most effectively be
reduced by offering trainings and reminders close to the point of an actor’s
decision making or other potentially discriminatory action. For example,
researchers have shown that doctors are most likely to refrain from man-
ifesting implicit bias in their decisions about dispensing pain medications
if they receive a reminder about the possible effects of implicit bias right
before or at the time they are making prescription decisions (Green
et al., 2007)
These observed effects involve the phenomenon of priming. Priming
refers to “the effect in which recent experience of a stimulus facilitates or
inhibits later processing of the same or a similar stimulus.” (American
Psychology Association Dictionary, “priming”). Such priming, or pre-
senting a reminder that taps into a person’s “fast” social thinking, can work
both ways. Priming can increase bias, of course; for example, young adults
asked to create sentences from the words “Florida, forgetful, bald, grey or
wrinkle,” later walk down a hallway more slowly than members of a control
group (Kahneman, 2013, pp. 53–54). But priming can also decrease bias
if constructed in artful ways. Thus, a reminder to the decision maker of
that actor’s desire to avoid bias can help produce less biased results if effec-
tively timed so that it happens right before or at the point of decision, as in
the example just given above about doctors prescribing pain medication.
These insights can also be helpful by indicating new ways of formulating
effective remedies in anti-discrimination cases. For example, an employer
found liable for discrimination in hiring or promotion decisions could be
required to hold implicit bias training sessions for decision makers and to
set up subsequent reminder systems that would activate soon before or at
important junctures in hiring or promotion processes. Such an employer
could also be asked to audit its systems and processes to determine where
it was using practices that were not necessary and contributed to disparate
impact harms. Employers could be required to produce self-audits and
reports that measure results in eliminating barriers and bias. Employers might
often find that such steps introduced greater rationality and productivity in
their systems in general, leading to benefits for all (Guinier & Strum, 2019).
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In summary, the research on the limited but partial effectiveness of train-
ings and similar techniques to reduce implicit bias suggests that courts
should think more creatively about using these remedial measures in anti-
discrimination cases. Along with remedies to make those subjected to dis-
crimination whole to the extent possible in law (such as through restitution,
back and front pay, reinstatement, and similar measures in employment
contexts), lawyers should consider asking for, and judges should consider
ordering, measures such as implicit bias training. Such training should be
followed by reminder modules or other systems that prime decision makers
to be conscious of possible tendencies toward implicit bias, timed to occur
right before or at the moment of decision making. Other important pro-
cesses the literature on implicit bias points to as necessary to produce less
biased institutions and systems involve the institution of procedures to
review, double check and audit aspects of institutional functioning that
are most likely to be sites where either implicit bias and/or effects-based
discrimination may occur. Many creative techniques can be envisioned to
detect and counter fast thinking biases of many types as well as effects-based
discrimination. However, introducing those ideas into the judicial system
will take much work, and may even call for a “consciousness revolution”
in law, as I will discuss further below.
Another way in which social neuroscience can help in fashioning
anti-discrimination remedies is in illuminating more about the harm dis-
crimination causes. Brain imaging studies have shown that individuals
who are ostracized from social groups experience intense pain (Borsook
& MacDonald, 2013; Pond, Richman, Chester, & DeWall, 2014). As
Pond and his fellow researchers have shown, even minor incidents, such
as being left out of a social game being played on a computer, produce these
results. Long-term exclusion has far more profound consequences, including
intense physical and psychological harm that can produce many anti-social
effects as well as destroying individuals’ self-esteem (Leary, Kowalski,
Smith, & Phillips, 2003; Williams, 2007).
Another large medical and epidemiological literature documents the
connections between racism and adverse health consequences, including
depression, anxiety, psychological stress, cardiac disease, and hypertension
(Paradies et al., 2015). New discoveries in epigenetics show intergenerational
transfer of adverse consequences from such trauma (Kuzawa & Sweet,
2009). This research shows that the social harm of discrimination is far
greater than legal systems currently recognize. Courts should admit this
research into evidence to allow complainants to prove higher damages in
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anti-discrimination cases. One danger here, however, is that courts may
regress to requiring such showings of acute pain in order to grant damages
for pain and suffering at all. They should not do so: the research shows that
all persons subject to sustained discrimination experience social pain, so
that pain and suffering awards should be standard in all cases. Again, as I will
discuss below, this research should not only be used in individual legal
cases but also to produce systemic change in legal rules and systems.
Similarly, medical and epigenetic studies reveal that imposing restitution
in individual cases does not go nearly far enough in forcing respondents to
“internalize” the costs (as an economist would say) of discriminatory sys-
tems. In order to use legal systems as one helpful tool (not the only one,
of course) in the project of eradicating discrimination, modifications in legal
rules must be made to more fully capture the nature of discrimination’s
harm. Law has had an important role to play in improving social conscious-
ness of this harm, but at this historical juncture it may be time for social neu-
roscience to move into the lead in guiding law further along this path.
Discrimination not only causes loss of individual resources such as housing,
jobs, medical care, education and the like, but also causes additional social
harms that are not sufficiently accounted for in current remedial doctrines.
2.3 Broadening doctrines that cramp the application
of anti-discrimination law
Another set of ways that social neuroscience can help in the field of
anti-discrimination law involves adjusting other doctrines that also tend
to constrict the ability of complainants to prove their cases. Courts often
impose these limiting rules as a way of clearing anti-discrimination cases
off their dockets, but the findings of social neuroscience counsel again appli-
cation of such restrictive doctrines. Doing so ignores what brain science
shows about how discrimination occurs.
Anti-discrimination cases have been subject to a great many, often irra-
tional, limiting doctrines. These problems extend to far more matters than I
can discuss here. A few examples, based on my own legal system in the
United States, can highlight some of these problems. A more thorough
discussion would require anti-discrimination lawyers in various legal systems
to compare examples, a project I hope might happen in a future, as yet
unplanned, conference. In the United States, anti-discrimination doctrine
requires an employee to experience a “material” harm, such as a loss of
pay, promotion, or job altogether. This material harm is what triggers an
actionable employment discrimination claim (Modjeska, 2017, § 1:2,
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pp. 1–4). This doctrine arises through courts’ interpretation of statutory law.
It is the existence of a material harm, also known as a “tangible” action, that
establishes that the employee has experienced discrimination in the “terms
and conditions of employment,” as provided in the statutory language of
federal anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Civil Rights Act, 1964).
Although this doctrine correctly states the statutory requirement, courts
have sometimes applied the material harm test too restrictively, dismissing
claims of discrimination based on exclusion from informal work groups,
trainings, social opportunities, or the assignment of workers to less attractive
work within a job classification (Carle, 2019, p. 711). Where excluding
persons from informal opportunities and/or assigning them less desirable
work gets in the way of their job success, however, material harm has
occurred. Better understanding the relationships among in-group bias, social
exclusion, and discrimination, as discussed above, could make courts more
attuned to how unlawful workplace discrimination takes place. Mere trivial
complaints should not make out an actionable claim, but courts should find
actionable claims based on facts showing long-term, repeated and persistent
exclusion and social shunning, where complainants establish that these prac-
tices are linked to their membership in traditional outsider identity groups
and have adverse implications for job success. Moreover, harmful impacts on
complainants’ psychological and physical well-being, as already discussed
above, establish the damages arising from such practices.
Another example involves anti-retaliation law. Most anti-discrimination
laws prohibit retaliation against persons who raise anti-discrimination
claims. In the United States, courts are somewhat more permissive about
the rules for showing retaliation, but still impose onerous restrictions as to
the acceptable manner of employees’ conduct in opposing discrimination
(Carle, 2019, pp. 215–17; Carle, 2016, p. 190). Again, social neuroscience
findings can be helpful here.
An interesting experimental social psychology literature documents a
phenomenon researchers have labeled the “black sheep” effect. A series
of experiments conducted by Jose M. Marques and Vincent Y. Yzerbyt
found that, in comparison to a control group, in-group members evaluated
in-groupmembers who deviate from group norms or standards far less favor-
ably than they evaluated out-group members who deviated in the same way
(Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). Thus, they found, group members’ judgments
about fellow in-group members were more extreme, in both directions,
than their judgments about out-group members. If group members
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perceived fellow in-group members as conforming to the group’s norms and
standards, they evaluated them as better than out-groupmembers, but if they
deviated from the group’s norms and standards, fellow in-group members
judged them more harshly. Marques and Yzerbyt suggest that this
so-called black sheep effect may reflect a process by which group members
define and esteem “good” exemplars of their group and at the same time
strongly reject “bad” ones, because their deviance from the group’s values
damages the self-esteem that comes with positive self-identification with
one’s identity group (pp. 289–91).
The black sheep effect, through which groups tend to be particu-
larly harsh toward internal dissenters (or “deviants” from social norms)
(Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988), has special relevance in the anti-retaliation con-
text. So-called “whistleblowers”—i.e., those who point out institutional
wrongdoing, whether because an institution has engaged in discrimination
or in other types of misconduct—typically are insider members of a team.
Members of such groups, bound together by codes of secrecy and loyalty,
find the presence of whistleblowers among them particularly repugnant
and thus are extremely prone to retaliate (Vaughn, 2012, pp. 63–65).
For this reason, as courts recognize to some extent but still not sufficiently
well, claims that employers or other institutional actors have retaliated
against someone who has “blown the whistle” on their misconduct must
be treated with special care.
In other words, as social neuroscience findings regarding the black sheep
effect attest, retaliation against those who accuse an employer or other insti-
tutional actor of committing illegal acts or moral wrongs is particularly
likely, even by otherwise lawful actors. To encourage and protect employees
who speak out against perceived wrongdoing, courts should err on the side
of providing more generous protections against retaliation.
Indeed, a consilience, meaning an “agreement between the appro-
aches to a topic of different academic subjects, especially science and the
humanities” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2020), has emerged between
the empirical findings of social psychologists and other science-based
researchers, on the one hand, and anti-discrimination scholars and other civil
rights policy advocates, on the other. This consilience between neurosci-
ence and progressive social policy discourse pushes toward greater protec-
tion for workplace dissenters as well as those who act differently in other
scenarios. As biologist, writer, and Nobel Laureate Edmund O. Wilson
has pointed out, a general consilience has emerged between the social
and biological sciences on the general matter of protecting diversity of all
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types in both the human and the environmental realms (Wilson, 1998).
Similarly, both social neuroscience and recent legal theory increasingly con-
verge on propositions counseling in favor of greater protection of a right to
act differently as a more general principle as well.
2.4 Expanding rights to act differently
Perhaps most importantly, social neuroscience points to the need for an
expansion of human rights to include the right of human beings to act dif-
ferently, so long as their actions do not impinge on the rights of others. This
is a longstanding principle of liberal philosophers such as John Stuart Mill,
who famously argued in On Liberty that individuals should be permitted
to do whatever they want as long as they do not harm others in doing so
(Mill, Bromwich, Kateb, & Elshtain, 2003, p. 139). This idea coincides with
the far more recent literature on neurodiversity in the disability rights con-
text, which points to the benefits to society derived from the vastly different
ways in which human brains are “wired” to exhibit different strengths, tal-
ents, and ways of thinking (Armstrong, 2011). Similarly, social neuroscience
and related social psychology literatures are replete with studies demonstrat-
ing the benefits of group processes that value diversity of all kinds. Such
appreciation for diversity in all manner of human differences—including
background, gender, skills, and other aspects of social identity—can lead
to better group dynamics, outcomes, and even more accurate factual
findings.
Experiments show that diversity of thinking in groups improves the
accuracy of collective outcomes, although only if the participants are each
required to think independently. If they remain subject to group influences,
or “group think,” those influences may cause individuals to follow the
crowd and agree to suboptimal outcomes, even outcomes that are objec-
tively, or factually, wrong (Berns, 2010; Phillips, 2014; Surowiecki, 2005;
Treynor, 1987).
A host of often-replicated classic experiments, conducted by researchers
such as StanleyMilgram,Muzafer Sheriff and SolomonAsh, have proved the
powerful social psychological effects of humans’ desire to conform. Thus, in
one classic example from the 1950s experimental psychologist Solomon
Asch found that when experimental subjects were placed in a group in
which they first heard other participants (who were in fact confederates
of the experimenter) give wrong answers to a factual question as to whether
the length of two lines was the same, these subjects were far more likely to
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give wrong answers than those in a control group who did not hear others
giving wrong answers (Berns, 2010, pp. 89–91). On the other hand, when
each member of a group was asked to give privately their own estimates of
the number of candies in a jar, and the researcher then took the average of all
of these individual responses, this aggregated estimate proved better than
even the best estimates of the individual estimators (Berns, 2010, p. 91).
This experimental psychology literature on the benefits of diversity and
the downsides of group conformity coincides with the appreciation of the
need for diversity in the biological sciences (Wilson, 2012, pp. 80–81).
As Wilson, who is by no means a leftist, writes
[p]erhaps the time has come … to adopt a new ethic of racial and hereditary
variation …. It would give proper measure to our species’ genetic variation as
an asset, prized for the adaptability it provides all of us during an increasingly
uncertain future. Humanity is strengthened by a broad portfolio of genes that
can generate new talents, additional resistance to diseases, and perhaps even
new ways of seeing reality. For scientific as well as for moral reasons, we should
learn to promote human biological diversity for its own sake instead of using it to
justify prejudice and conflict.
Wilson (2012, p. 80–81).
In short, a consilience has arisen among the political theory literature of
classic liberal philosophers, the biological sciences, and social neuroscience.
This consilience provides another boost to arguments supporting the pro-
motion of diversity writ large. Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that, while a
subject of great debate among social commentators today, the benefits of
diversity are largely noncontroversial to a host of researchers based in a wide
array of natural science-based disciplines.
Legal anti-discrimination theorists are similarly pursuing lines of
inquiry that support expanding and generalizing a broader right to act
differently. Here I will provide a brief summary, drawing primary from
the US legal theory I know best. In recent decades, legal scholars who have
focused in this direction include Kenji Yoshimo, who introduced the term
“covering” to describe how discrimination can work by requiring persons to
hide aspects of their identity in order to be socially accepted (Yoshino,
2007). In other words, he argues, in contemporary cosmopolitan social
conditions, more privileged outsiders may be “included, but only if we
behave like insiders—that is, only if we cover” (p. 22). Yoshino inquires
why, half a century after US law imposed broad anti-discrimination man-
dates, so many people still feel the need to disguise their “authentic selves”
in this way (Yoshino, 2007, p. 184). In personally reflective sections of his
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book, Yoshino focuses on two aspects of his own identity, as a gay man and
as a person of Japanese descent who was raised in the United States with an
ambivalent relationship to his ethnic heritage. Interweaving personal narra-
tive with legal and theoretical analysis, including comparative analysis of
German law, Yoshino argues for an anti-discrimination paradigm that
would grant greater protection to what he calls, drawing on his translation
of the German phrase, a “right to personality” (p. 189). Yoshino’s vision for
the future has wonmany dedicated followers. A recent contribution that builds
from Yoshino is Zachery Kramer’s book, appropriately titled Outsiders. Using
engaging examples, Kramer similarly argues for a discrimination-based
right to expression of one’s personality (Kramer, 2019, pp. 4–5).
Still other leading anti-discrimination scholars turn to history for
instances in which law expanded (not necessarily but contingently; there
is nothing inevitable about this) to make more room for supporting human
difference. In her award-winning book,Vagrant Nation, DeanRisa Goluboff
traces a decades’ long campaign to strike down so-called “vagrancy laws,”
which criminalized those socially constructed as having the status of
so-called deviants. Goluboff traces the origins of anti-vagrancy laws to
16th Century English concepts of everyone having a proper place; those
lacking social power who threatened to move out of their proper place
faced prosecution for no other reason than this, whether they were “out
of place socially, culturally, politically, racially, sexually, economically or
spatially” (pp. 1–2). The people against whom local law enforcement applied
these laws in the 20th Century United States included poor and homeless
persons—and especially Black persons, even when employed—as well as
non-geographically attached persons encompassed under the traditional
image of the “hobo.” Law enforcement targeted a wide range of others
under vagrancy laws because they did not conform to social norms. As
Goluboff puts it, “the ‘queer,’ the ‘Commie,’ the ‘uppity’ black man, the
‘scruffy’ young white one,” all embodied difference; the police and others
who enforced law were “trained to see difference as dangerous, to see the
unusual as criminal” (p. 3).
Goluboff thus focuses on the commonality, in the form of shared perse-
cution through vagrancy laws, underlying various forms of deviance.
Vagrancy law bound together political dissenters, including war protestors,
communists, and irascible political contrarians, all of whomwere prosecuted
under their authority, as well as those who dissented from the racial caste
system: “[If you are f]or integration[,] [y]ou’re a Vagrant” (p. 123). Police
applied vagrancy laws to dignified African American ministers taking part
in civil rights protests, mixed-race groups in the South, and persons in
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the "wrong" racial neighborhoods all over the country. Sexual minorities
also came under these laws’ reach, in prosecutions of so-called “vag”
lewd charges against gay men and arrests of persons of both sexes for dressing
in the clothes traditional for the opposite sex. Vagrancy laws were applied
to women having sex outside marriage and persons committing the
then-taboo act of having sex across racial lines. Police defined hippies, beat-
niks, and other members of the counterculture of the 1950s and 1960s as
dangerous and “vagged” them because they violated conventional norms
about styles of dress, hair, and lifestyle (pp. 53–55, 123, 295).
Goluboff does not focus on the application of vagrancy and similar laws
to persons with disabilities, but another book fills in that important gap. In
The Ugly Laws, Susan Schweik documents how civic leaders used vagrancy
and other laws to banish from public spaces persons with disabilities others
viewed as unsightly. As in Goluboff’s narrative, Schweik (2009) shows how
persons with power used laws to exclude and penalize persons regarded as
repugnant due to their perceived differences. Both books trace various
strains of the complex, decades-long coalition-building, and, as it happened,
eventually successful activism to abolish vagrancy statutes and ugly laws.
These initiatives contribute to the history underlying broader recognition
of a general right to act differently.
Recognizing such a more general right, however, will require some-
what different strategies than the ones Goluboff and Schweik document,
for a number of reasons. First, there is an inherent paradox in mandating
tolerance (in order words, protecting persons’ rights to act differently),
because any rule that requires tolerance tends itself to be intolerant as
enforced. As Yoshino notes, not all anti-discrimination and fairness
goals can be accomplished directly through so-called “hard” law, meaning,
basically, law that can be enforced in court (Yoshino, 2007, p. 192). Thus,
best strategies for expanding general rights to act differently may involve
using neuroscience findings to persuade through “soft” law. By soft
law, I mean such quasi-legal techniques, now a subject of great interest
by legal scholars, as voluntary standards, best practices guidance, social boy-
cott (and reward) campaigns, and the like (see, e.g., Bradlow &Hunter, 2019;
Levin & Mather, 2018). These strategies use social pressure—which, as
previously discussed, social neuroscience shows to be very effective in
producing conformity in groups (see, e.g., Berns, 2010, p. 246; Blass,
2000). Behavioral economics and experimental social psychology may
be helpful not only in expanding protections in the field of anti-
discrimination law, but also in informing the strategies that might best help
us get there.
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3. Regulating the use of neuroscience
in anti-discrimination law
There are two ways neuroscience might be used in civil anti-
discrimination cases. (I do not here consider the use of neuroscience in
criminal cases, though a fascinating, and burgeoning, literature exists on
that topic (see, e.g., Hughes, 2011; Larson, 2016; Winslade, 2002). One
is in particular anti-discrimination cases and the other is in law and policy
reform on a broader, possibly even system-wide, scale.
3.1 Using neuroscience in particular cases
Using expert evidence and peer reviewed neuroscience studies would
not be at all unusual in anti-discrimination litigation. Litigators in anti-
discrimination cases routinely use many types of science-based evidence,
including introducing into evidence statistical findings by industrial psychol-
ogists, as well as actuarial data, mathematical economists’ modeling results,
demographics of labor and applicant pools, and much more. Science-based
studies and testimony by experts about such studies frequently come into
cases to help prove both disparate impact and disparate treatment discrimi-
nation, as well as to prove causation, general and specific damages, physical
and psychological harm, pain and suffering, and the like.
There thus should be nothing special about using neuroscience in par-
ticular lawsuits in the same way that one would use any of these other expert
evidence based on findings produced through accepted scientific methods.
The findings of neuroscience are well respected as scientific evidence, and
expert scientific evidence stemming from neuroscience should readily
achieve admission into evidence in individual cases, with some ethics caveats
that I will discuss in a later section of this article.
Legal systems have evolving standards (though often comparatively
different ones (Taylor, 1996)), for evaluating expert testimony. In the
United States, the standards for the admissibility of expert testimony are
articulated in a case called Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(1993). Daubert requires courts to assess five factors in deciding on the
admissibility of scientific evidence. Those factors include:
1. Whether the claim or theory has been tested;
2. Whether the research has been subject to sufficient peer review and
publication;
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3. Its known or potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling its operation; and
4. Whether the findings are widely accepted in a respected scientific
community.
The use of social neuroscience can be regulated under these same standards.
Implicit bias research has clearly been accepted by a respected scientific
community, making it admissible as expert testimony in individual cases
so long as the particular studies being relied on meet the requirements listed
above or comparable ones as framed in the legal jurisdiction in question.
3.2 Using neuroscience to inform policy and reform
anti-discrimination law
A second way of using social neuroscience in anti-discrimination law
would be to draw from it to inform policy and lawmaking on a system-wide
basis. This is the spirit in which I have suggested using social neuroscience
to reform anti-discrimination law through the specific proposals I have
sketched above. To achieve system-wide reforms, it is not enough simply
to introduce neuroscientists’ findings in particular lawsuits. If the structure
or set of rules through which those cases are processed does not change in
response to the policy implications of what neuroscience shows, then there
will be no broad, lasting change in the law in the directions I suggest. For
example, if the legal rule is that intent must be shown in order to prove a
case of disparate treatment, there will be no finding of a legal violation even
if implicit—i.e., unconscious, non-volitional—bias can be established
through the use of social neuroscience testing methods such as the Stroop
test. The overall set of rules, doctrines and policies in the law need to be
reformed in order for the findings of neuroscience to have maximum
impact. The question thus becomes, can we expect neuroscience to have
an impact on law in this system-wide way?
Those who are not law trained may have an optimistic hope that the
powerful facts about human social behavior that neuroscience establishes,
including but not limited to those covered in my brief overview above, will,
by the sheer force of their logic and the reliability (albeit partial and tempo-
rary (Kuhn & Hacking, 2012)) of scientific evidence, lead to change in law.
As a scholar of legal change, however, I very much doubt this can be the
case. Facts and logic typically do not change law; social movements do
(see, e.g., Brown-Nagin, 2012). Historical experience and politics also factor
into change in law, as the Legal Realists taught so many years ago.
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Thus, I will propose: social neuroscience needs to operate as something
more than science if it is to be incorporated into the underpinnings of policy
and law. This proposition will undoubtedly make some brain scientists
uneasy. It is likely to make ethicists uneasy too, for reasons I will discuss later
in this article. Historically, neuroscience has been used for a variety of polit-
ical goals, some positive or benign and some very far from that, including
in some neuroscientists’ partnership with the genocidal programs of the
Third Reich (Loewenau & Weindling, 2016; Illes & Bird, 2006, p. 1).
Thus, the intersection of neuroscience and law writ large necessarily
involves questions of ethics, values and cultural ideas.
As I have suggested, encouraging a partnership between neuroscience
and law reform requires a social movement. There are promising signs of
policy makers’ increasing interest in social neuroscience broadly conceived,
especially in the findings about implicit bias, which, in the racial justice
movement especially, have sprung to the fore in public consciousness
(see, e.g., Kendi, 2019). The implications of implicit bias research play a sig-
nificant role in calls for institutional reform, especially in policing and other
aspects of the criminal justice system.
The problem with advocating for the use of social neuroscience to
reform policy is that policy advocacy is not something most scientists rou-
tinely do. Scientists do research and then document and publish results. To
be credible and have integrity, scientists do not, and usually should not, have
a vested interest in how their results will be used. To be sure, they choose
topics and research directions based on their values and personal intellec-
tual interests, but they must be willing to acknowledge the limits of their
findings and their possible flaws. Advocacy, on the other hand, works in
a very different way, using the techniques of rhetoric to persuade and sim-
plify rather than to qualify, interrogate, and make more complex.
In considering how neuroscience can affect social policy in the area
of anti-discrimination law, the following reality must be acknowledged:
law will not change simply because science shows it should. This is a plain
fact that even a neuroscientist as brilliant as neurologist, biologist, primatol-
ogist, popular science translator and writer Robert Sapolsky fails to realize.
In a recent popular book, Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and
Worst, Sapolsky rails against the way that criminal law requires the supposi-
tion that human beings have “free will” and thus should be punished for
bad acts because they had the ability to resist committing them (pp. 580).
As Sapolsky points out, brain scientists know that human beings often
cannot avoid carrying out the bad acts they commit. Bad acts may
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bepredetermined by the individual’s brain wiring, including experiences
that have irrevocably shaped that individual’s brain. Why then, he asks, does
law rest on the very obvious “fiction” of free will?
One could take issue with Sapolsky’s assumption that free will is
utterly a fiction and, indeed, neuroethicists have proposed other appro-
aches to understanding the free will versus determinism conundrum (e.g.,
Schaffner, 2002, p. 30). Schaffner, for example, proposes not a “sweeping
determinism” but instead what he terms “creeping” or partial reductionism,
in which free will with respect to any choice is the default position that
can be modified by excusing conditions on a case-by-case basis (Illes &
Bird, 2006; Schaffner, 2002). But regardless of what neuroscience continues
to discover about the balance between free will and predetermined,
brain-based causes for an individual’s behavior, law can never fully succumb
to a deterministic view of human conduct because law represents the artic-
ulation, reflection, enforcement and propagation of a set of values and norms
held by a particular social group. Law presumes the fiction of free will
because the societies that rely on that concept believe in punishment for
morally bad acts.
Indeed, this is why law typically requires a showing of intentional bad
actions to impose liability for discrimination, as discussed above. It may
be that law can be persuaded not to impose standards of moral wrong on
all discriminatory acts, however. In the past, vagrancy laws punished out-
siders simply for the status of being “deviant” in some socially salient way
(Goluboff, 2016), as discussed above, but today many social systems world-
wide no longer regard deviance that is based on non-volitional human
difference as a punishable wrong. So too can law decide not to rely on proof
of "bad" intent as the prerequisite for using the courts’ remedial powers to
rectify practices that cause discriminatory effects, as I have argued above.
Social change is due to many factors, including historical, social, political
and economic developments, improved scientific understandings of the
brain and other aspects of human functioning, and, most importantly, social
movements that have fought for change in the way law treats vulnerable and
marginalized communities. Extending that fight even more generally, to
embrace more forms of acting differently that do not cause harm to others
will require further social activism. Such change may be harder to achieve
because the proposition that all persons should have the right to act differ-
ently, being general in its scope, may not motivate particular communities to
action in the same way that the identity-based movements of past moments
in history generally have. But evolving human rights norms, and coalitions
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among many identity groups, somewhat along the lines of what Goluboff
excavates in her study of anti-vagrancy law in the United States, may help
produce such a movement.
Of course, the opposite historical trajectory is equally if not more
likely given current worldwide political conditions. Those conditions
suggest a worldwide movement toward more intolerance, “othering” or
“cossification” of marginalized others, and a generalized stirring up of hatred
of difference as some political leaders tap into the irrational thought processes
that lead to these results. What the future holds in this respect is anyone’s
guess as I write these words. My point is that the findings of social neuro-
science at least provide the empirical support for a movement to protect,
value, and indeed encourage human difference, and that those who support
such a movement can and should draw on social neuroscience to help
support this work.
Put most simply, law is a complex set of cultural artifacts embodying
a legal system’s values, judgments, conceptual constructions and deep
assumptions—and, yes, also its prejudices, biases, fast thinking and irrational-
ity. Law is not logic at its core, and thus logic alone will not move law.
Particular legal systems may move toward expanded rights protections or
in the opposite direction or, most likely, some complex combination of
both. There is nothing inevitable about any direction, so human agency will
be required to make the policy arguments and seek to influence systems
external to but related to law, such a public opinion, private practices,
and changing norms and values. All of these factors can in turn shape law
in the directions neuroscience findings support.
4. The ethics of using neuroscience
in anti-discrimination law
So far, I have suggested some of the benefits of using social neurosci-
ence in anti-discrimination law. Yet, as in all things, benefits also come with
drawbacks, and these must be considered as well. Here I discuss a few that I
find particularly salient. One involves the problem of reducing complex
human behavior— i.e., the wildly irrational human mind and dynamic,
unpredictable unconscious of Freud’s quasi-literary psychology—to the
deterministic assumptions of natural science as applied to humans, as the
introduction discussed. What happens to imagination, transgression, human
freedom?What happens to the “fiction” of free will that Sapolsky so opposes
as a neuroscientist, but upon which law’s basic assumptions of moral
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responsibility rest? I think the answers to these ethical questions are fairly
straightforward, as I have already discussed above. Science is not, and never
will or can be, the only system of ideas operating in a social system. There
will always be room for human brains to respond to and be influenced by
the humanistic disciplines, and law seems likely to continue to impose con-
sequences based on concepts of moral responsibility even if neuroscience
helps law see that the scope of “free will” is narrower than law current
assumes (Winslade, 2002).
A second, more serious ethics concern involves the use of neuroscience
testing on individuals as evidence of motive or intent. If anti-discrimination
law does not change to eliminate intent requirements in the way I suggest
above, then implicit bias testing could be used on individuals to establish
and impose penalties for the existence of bias, albeit of an unconscious
and non-volitional nature. Although by definition implicit bias is not
“intentional” prejudice, because there is no conscious, volitional intent in
this regard, there is considerable danger that such evidence could be used
in particular cases. This would constitute a disturbing misuse of the lessons
of neuroscience, but one can certainly imagine this occurring if political
and social circumstances allowed, including (or even especially) in highly
politically progressive social environments. Thus, one important ethical
limitation of neuroscience evidence in anti-discrimination law is that it
should never be used against individuals to establish “bad” action or
thoughts.
A third concerning possibility is that the insights of neuroscience could
be used for goals antithetical to those I outline here. Just as social neurosci-
ence can help illuminate paths toward eliminating illegal discrimination, as I
have argued above, the discipline’s discoveries could also be used for con-
trary purposes. Just as social neuroscience can aid progressive reformers,
social neuroscience can provide insights to those who wish to inflame hatred
by exploiting the human brain’s tendency to be suspicious, fearful, and
even disgusted when it unconsciously detects social difference. among
people. As discussed, perceptions of trivial differences between in-groups
and out-groups can lead to negative social reactions to out-groups as the
brain non-volitionally reacts to the group as inferior, or even detestable
and worthy of persecution at the extreme.
To be sure, political demagogues appear to have little trouble inflaming
hatred of “the other” in order to exploit social division for their political
gain, even though these political figures typically are not fans of the neuro-
science literature—or, indeed, of science at all. They do not need an expert
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guide to sow division and hate because their own fast thinking gives them
an intuitive feel for how to play this type of politics. But just as the findings
of social neuroscience may come to help institutional reformers train
decision makers to reduce their chances of acting on implicit biases, so
too can one imagine those who wish to inflame hatred and dissention using
science-based techniques to improve their success in this regard. The many
recent examples of disinformation campaigns used to influence the politics
of foreign countries provide early warnings of this enormous negative
potential.
Similarly, institutional leaders may use the insights of social neuroscience
to select institutional participants who exhibit the personality, or brain-based
characteristics, they prefer. These preferred characteristics could just as
easily include such features as fierce in-group loyalty, tendencies toward
extreme conformity, unwillingness to challenge authority, strong implicit
biases and similar traits. In other words, neuroscience could be used as easily
to promote reactionary tendencies as the progressive ones I champion
above, such as open-mindedness, tolerance, and a positive interest in persons
not like oneself. These are the characteristics I have been arguing institutions
should encourage. My proposals call for encouraging human tendencies
toward appreciating—and in fact reveling in—human difference, but those
arguments rest on my own moral preferences or “tastes.”
To further explore this ethics issue, it will be helpful to turn to another
experiment-based subfield of neuroscience called “moral cognitive neuro-
science.” This field explores the correlations between personality ten-
dencies, political orientations, and styles and priorities in human moral
thinking (Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005).
Like social neuroscience, the field draws on the findings of experimental
psychology, cognitive neuroscience, cultural anthropology, primate studies,
developmental psychology, and more, to understand more scientifically
how human moral thinking takes place. In order to apply the insights of
that field here, it will be helpful to take a step back and outline some of
the key debates taking place within it.
Two of its leaders, both of whom have helped popularize its ideas
through accessible books, are Jonathan Haidt, a business school professor
at New York University, and Joshua Greene, a member of the psychology
department and Center for Brain Science at Harvard University. As these
two scholars explain in a coauthored article, their goals are to show that
“moral reasoning matters, but it matters in social context,” and that
“much, though not necessarily all, moral judgment makes use of processes
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specifically dedicated to social cognition” (Greene & Haidt, 2002). Haidt
and Greene’s theories differ from each other in some respects, but both offer
many useful insights on using social neuroscience in law reform.
The central insight of moral cognitive neuroscience borrows from and
extends the implications of Tversky and Kahneman’s findings about fast
and slow thinking. Not surprisingly, moral judgment, viewed through
the lens of brain science, has an extensive automatic, intuitive, and uncon-
scious dimension. Haidt and Greene differ in their views as to the balance
between intuitive, emotional or automatic thinking about moral issues—
what Greene labels “automatic” thinking, versus what he terms deliberative
thinking, which Greene labels as thinking in a “manual” mode. Haidt
believes that in moral judgment there is very little to the manual mode,
or deliberate, rational thinking. He reaches this conclusion based on his
experimental work showing that human beings generally make moral judg-
ments very quickly, as characteristic of automatic or intuitive processes
(Haidt, 2013, p. 28). In his view, the brain “does morality” just as it does
other automatic judgment processes such as social exclusion. In support
of this view, Haidt points out that when experimenters ask people to explain
how they made moral judgments, these subjects insist that they make them
on the basis of rational deliberation; however, when researchers ask them
to explain the deliberation leading to their judgments, the subjects cannot
present convincing rationales (Haidt, 2013, p. xiv). Instead, their explana-
tions appear strategic—in other words, ad hoc explanations devised after
the fact of judgment (Haidt, 2013, p. 44).
Haidt’s findings echo the arguments of the American Legal Realists
(introduced above), who argued that judges and other legal decision makers
do not reach legal judgments based on rational deliberation but by intuition,
and then backfill with legal logic to support their intuitive conclusions, using
whichever of many often inconsistent legal argumentation devices they need
to support their conclusion. Thus, Jerome Frank, who had a deep interest in
psychology, as already noted, famously declared that judges’ legal decisions
are based on what they had for breakfast, which he meant as a facetious way
of proposing that legal decision making is based on unconscious, intuitive
factors (i.e., fast or automatic thinking) rather than on rational deliberation
(i.e., deliberative or manual thinking). Again, a consilience emerges in
theories about how human thinking works: Haidt’s experiments support
the insights of the Legal Realists from nearly century ago.
Haidt proposes six moral dimensions with corresponding emotions that
form the foundations of moral thought. These include polarities such as
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loyalty versus betrayal—the very tradeoff involved in whistle-blowing, as
I have discussed above—as well as five others that are not necessary to
explain here. Extensive testing has shown that participants place different
relative weights on these different dimensions or polarities, even within
the same culture, due to factors such as personality differences (Haidt,
2013, pp. 178–79). Pointing to the bitter divisions between political and
social conservatives versus liberals in the United States today, Haidt argues
that these polarities explain the intensive disagreements in many political
cultures. Different persons have different moral palates or “tastes,” and,
because moral judgment is intuitive and emotional, members of warring
political groups cannot change each other’s minds on moral questions
through rational argument.
Greene, in turn, argues for what he calls a “dual process” theory of moral
judgment (Greene, 2013). According to Greene, both intuitive and delib-
erative processes are at work in moral decision making. When the two pro-
cesses arrive at the same moral judgment, the dual process system works
wonderfully. However, in other situations, the two processes conflict.
Greene believes he has captured evidence of such conflict between auto-
matic and manual mode moral thinking through his ingenious experimental
adaptation of a classic ethics problem known as the “Trolley Problem.”
That problem, designed by philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson, posits that
a trolley without a driver has escaped from a station and is hurtling toward
five workers who are standing on the track (Thomson, 1985). The moral
question is whether it would be acceptable for a person knowing the
situation to move a lever in a switching station to divert the trolley onto
another track on which only one person is standing, so that only one rather
than five will be killed. Greene found through repeated experiments that
most people state that this would either be acceptable or perhaps even mor-
ally required, apparently on the utilitarian ground that it is better to kill only
one person rather than five. Yet, as Thomson points out, this same moral
intuition does not always hold. Most people say that it would not be morally
acceptable for a doctor to kill one healthy patient in order to use his lungs,
heart, and kidneys to save five others.
Greene and his colleagues take Thomson’s basic scenario and give it
another twist. Their first scenario is the same as Thomson’s; their second asks
if it would be equally morally acceptable to physically push a person onto the
tracks at the station to stop the trolley from hitting the five people standing
on the tracks further on. As one might expect, many fewer experimental
subjects agree that it would be morally acceptable to push someone onto
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the tracks, even though using one’s hand to move the lever to switch
the train onto the track on which only one person is standing involves a
person exercising moral agency, just in a less physical and intensely
immediate way.
Greene uses these experimental results to make a number of points. First,
like Haidt, Greene argues that his experiments capture the fact that moral
thinking is intuitive, emotional and based on automatic processes. He sug-
gests that the reason so few people will accept pushing someone on the tracks
in the face of an oncoming train to prevent the death of five, which makes
rational sense in utilitarian terms, is because humans’ “automatic” settings
abhor violence toward fellow members of what he calls their circle of regard
(Greene, 2013, p. 217–18). Moreover, Greene argues, humans use faulty
heuristics in moral judgment, including one that distinguishes in an auto-
matic and rapid way between intent and side effects. The act of moving
the lever to switch the train onto a different track appears to have the intent
of saving four human lives, with the unfortunate side effect of killing some-
one on that track, while the act of pushing someone into a train one can
see coming appears to have the intent of killing someone, which intuitively
feels immoral, even though in fact both acts are the same. In short, Greene
concludes, rapid, intuitive thinking in the context of moral judgment
uses heuristics just as other types of rapid, intuitive thinking do. These heu-
ristics may generally be useful—as, for example, when one must make a
split-second decision about the morally right thing to do in a tragic
emergency—but are also inflexible and sometimes irrational, as shown in
the experiment described above. Heuristics ignore the harmful side effects
of decisions that feel moral or right, what Greene terms “modular myopia”
(Greene, 2013, p. 224).
Greene gleans even more from his trolley experiment when he conducts
the experiment with subjects in brain scanners in order to explore where in
their brains moral decision making takes place. He asks his subjects first to
think about their intuitive response, and then to think about why pushing
someone into the oncoming train to save five lives may rationally be the
better moral outcome. Greene finds that subjects thinking intuitively acti-
vate the parts of their brains that process social thinking. Moreover, people
asked to think about the reasons for pushing someone in front of an oncom-
ing train to save five lives have a hard time doing so. Their response times
slows, showing that they are operating under a cognitive load. Here, Greene
explains, automatic and manual mode thinking processes are in conflict
(Greene, 2013, pp. 115–17).
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I want to end by suggesting that all social reformers must be cognizant
of the tendency toward moral myopia that Greene identifies. Eradicating
discrimination is likely to have negative side effects, which in the viewpoints
of libertarians and like thinkers involve moral harms. For example, barring
discrimination helps prevent its profound social harm, but also requires
encroaching on individual actors’ free agency.Moral cognitive neuroscience
teaches the importance of self-reflection, detachment and skepticism—even,
or especially, about the moral principles one holds most dear.
With these guiding insights in mind, further dialogue with those
who disagree should take place in bringing social neuroscience to bear on
the task of eradicating discrimination. There should be limits to the use
of neuroscience in law, even for such worthy purposes as enhancing law’s
ability to identify and deter discrimination. Those using social neuroscience
for such ends may be subject to fallibilities in moral thinking just as
those opposed to these political objectives are subject to moral errors of
their own. Further dialogue, appealing to both deliberative logic and moral
emotion, will be necessary.
5. Conclusion
In modern social conditions, human beings often deal with persons
who are different from themselves. Modern societies, which are politically
based on pluralism and economically based on labor specialization, could not
exist without a rich variety of differences among people (Rosen, 1983).
The non-volitional brain processes that can react negatively to perceived
differences are maladaptive in present social conditions. Neuroscience—
and especially the field of social neuroscience, which focuses directly on
how the brain engages in social behavior—can help law diminish dis-
crimination based on identity characteristics that are specially protected
because of past histories of subordination. Although this task will not be
easy, it is an imperative one, and advances in social neuroscience can help
accomplish it.
The findings of neuroscience must gain traction among judges, policy
makers, law makers and opinion makers. Law can be influenced by science
but it is not a science, contrary to the views of our 18th century forbearers.
Law is full of irrationality just as the human brain is, and necessarily so since it
is a construct or collective artifact of human life. Thus neuroscientists must
continue to produce science, and to challenge, improve, critique and revise
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it, while social activists, lawyers, opinion makers, law makers and judges
continue to champion its benefits so that it becomes part of the cultural
context through which law can improve equality and fairness in life oppor-
tunities for all.
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